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Abstract
This special focus of Refuge highlights the widespread but 
under-researched occurrence of age discrimination in 
forced migration law, policy, and practice. Using a concep-
tual lens of social age, authors analyze the ways in which 
people in situations of forced migration are treated differ-
ently on the basis of chronological age, biological devel-
opment, and family status. By framing this differential 
treatment as discrimination, this special focus approaches 
age as an equity issue. Such an approach differentiates the 
articles presented here from other recent scholarship on 
specific age groups, which is framed largely in terms of their 
vulnerabilities and needs. This special focus is intended to 
stimulate further research and activism on age discrimina-
tion in all its forms in varying contexts of forced migration.
Résumé
L’accent particulier accordé à ce sujet dans Refuge souligne 
l’incidence généralisée, bien qu’insuffisamment étudiée, 
de la discrimination fondée sur l’âge dans la législation, 
la politique et la pratique concernant la migration forcée. 
À l’aide de l’optique théorique de l’âge social, les auteurs 
abordent une analyse du traitement différencié accordée 
aux personnes en situation de migration forcée en fonc-
tion de leur âge chronologique, de leur développement 
biologique et de leur statut familial. En considérant ces 
différences dans le traitement par l’entremise du cadre de 
la discrimination, l’âge est conçu en tant qu’enjeu d’équité 
dans l’optique de cette approche particulière. Une telle 
approche dans les articles présentés ici se démarque des 
travaux et recherches récentes sur les groupes d’âge spéci-
fiques qui se conceptualisent plutôt en fonction des vulné-
rabilités et besoins des sujets concernés. Cette approche 
particulière vise à inciter des recherches ultérieures ainsi 
que des activités politiques concernant la discrimination 
fondée sur l’âge dans toutes ses manifestations dans les 
divers contextes de la migration forcée.
Conceptualizing Age Discrimination in Contexts of 
Forced Migration
Most migration law and policy—both domestic and international—use chronological age as the predominant definition of generational categories. 
For example, Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child defines a child as “every human being below 
the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier.”2 These chronological 
age-based categories are reproduced in migration laws and 
policies. For example, at a domestic level, Canada’s Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) for the most part uses 
chronological age definitions of children and older people.3 
While intended to provide a clear-cut way to justify inclusion 
in (and exclusion from) age categories, this predominant reli-
ance on chronological age is problematic for many reasons.
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First, as Kimberly Seibel and Stephanie J. Silverman 
point out in their articles in this volume, people in situa-
tions of forced migration may not necessarily know their 
chronological birthdate and/or may not have documents to 
prove it. In the absence of “proof” of their chronological age, 
displaced people faced with entering demographic data on 
migration forms may be obliged to invent what Seibel calls 
“bureaucratic birthdates,”4 with far-reaching administrative 
consequences in access to services structured according to 
chronological age categories. Absence of proof for unac-
companied minors in the United Kingdom has also led 
to the use of controversial age assessments as an imposed 
“solution” to age disputes in order to legitimize the concep-
tion of “real” children, as Silverman explains.
Second, chronological age categories are arbitrary in the 
sense that they really only mark the passage of time. While 
in Western medical, psychological, and educational circles, 
there has been a tendency to assume that chronological age 
is a proxy for biological, cognitive, and social development, 
recent research in these fields indicates a wide range of vari-
ation on all these issues due to a combination of genetic and 
environmental factors.5 Another indicator of the arbitrary 
nature of chronological age categories relates to the wide 
variation of definitions even within the same document. 
For example, in IRPA, while children are generally defined 
as under the age of eighteen, there are different chronologi-
cal age requirements for application processes.6
Third, in many contexts, other biological and social mark-
ers of age are as, if not more, important than chronological 
age. These include puberty, marital status, parenthood and 
child rearing, formal employment, enrolment in education, 
and menopause.7 It should also be noted that some age 
categories—such as children—refer to a period of human 
development, as well as a social and familial relationship.
In response to these flaws within the prevailing chrono-
logical approach to age, authors in this volume have adopted 
the complementary concept of social age. Social age refers 
to “socially constructed meanings applied to physical devel-
opment and roles attributed to infants, children, young 
people, adults and elders, as well as their intra- and inter-
generational relationships.”8 Being attentive to these power 
relations, articles in this special focus analyze discrimina-
tion on the basis of chronological age, social age, and family 
status. By highlighting age discrimination, we are interested 
in politicizing age and recognizing it as an equity issue. This 
approach differentiates our scholarship from many studies 
in migration literature, which frames age primarily in terms 
of vulnerability and needs. 
Age as an Equity Issue:9 Defining Discrimination
In this special focus, authors address direct and indirect, as 
well as positive and negative discrimination. According to 
Article 2(2) of the European Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 
direct discrimination occurs when “one person is treated 
less favourably than another has been or would be treated 
in a comparable situation.” Here, the idea of equality cen-
tres on “the Aristotelean notion that likes should be treated 
alike.”10 Direct discrimination is evident in, for example, 
age-based criteria for migrants in “skilled worker” catego-
ries in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.11 Indirect dis-
crimination, in contrast, involves “instances of apparently 
equal treatment which impacts more heavily on people of a 
certain age.”12 For example, fixed timeframes for residency 
requirements have differential impacts on people in differ-
ent stages of their lives and are relatively more significant for 
younger than older people.
While scholarship, litigation, and advocacy against gen-
der and racial discrimination in immigration are prevalent, 
age issues have received much less attention, both domesti-
cally and internationally. Fredman argues that one of the 
reasons that age is belatedly considered in equality discus-
sions and legislation is that it “does not define a discrete 
group. We have all been young, and we will all, if we are 
fortunate, become old.”13 This has led some to make the “fair 
innings” argument: age-based discrimination will affect all 
of us at some point in our lives and, therefore, there is no 
real inequality on the grounds of age. Indeed, some argue 
that equity considerations dictate that older people receive 
less access to employment14 and health care15 so as to ensure 
that younger age groups get their “fair share” and reduce 
intergenerational inequity.
However, the “fair innings” argument is problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, as Fredman argues, “two life-spans 
cannot be genuinely compared” because there are too many 
variables in each individual’s life and because of evolving leg-
islative and policy changes, which will affect some people in 
certain age categories while others were not affected at that 
stage of their life.16 These issues are particularly relevant for 
our discussion of migration, where migration status inter-
sects with age categories and where people are subject to dif-
ferent national jurisdictions at different stages of life as they 
cross borders. Second, Fredman points out that “the same 
event might affect two people of different generations quite 
differently, even if it occurs to both at the same age.”17 
In a widely cited Canadian case of Gosselin v Quebec 
(Attorney General) one of the dissenting judges, Bastarche 
(4 SCR 429) argued,
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While age is a ground that is experienced by all people, it is not 
necessarily experienced in the same way by all people at all times. 
Large cohorts may use age to discriminate against smaller, more 
vulnerable cohorts. A change in economic, historical or politi-
cal circumstances may mean that presumptions and stereotypes 
about a certain age group no longer hold true. Moreover, the fact 
remains that, while one’s age is constantly changing, it is a per-
sonal characteristic that at any given moment one can do nothing 
to alter. Accordingly, age falls squarely within the concern of the 
equality provision that people not be penalized for characteristics 
they either cannot change or should not be asked to change.
However, it should be noted that this was a dissenting 
opinion, and many policymakers and judges continue to 
use variations of the “fair innings” argument to justify dis-
criminatory practices on the bases of age.
A second argument that is sometimes advanced to justify 
differential treatment is that this is necessary to recognize 
the different capacities and/or situations of different age 
groups. Indeed, in some cases, this differential treatment 
is positive, according particular age groups specific provi-
sions and protections on the basis of their evolving capaci-
ties or loss of adaptability. For example, in 2012, the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that 
states “expeditiously and completely cease the detention 
of children on the basis of their immigration status.” Not 
all differential treatment on the grounds of age is inher-
ently discriminatory or negative. However, in some cases, 
assumptions about difference are not empirically proven, 
nor applicable to the particular individual. As argued above, 
biological aging processes differ across individuals based on 
both genetic and environmental factors. Moreover, differ-
ence should not preclude equality of opportunity. Feminists 
have long argued that equality does not mean sameness.18 
According to Fredman, the focus should be on “the facilita-
tion of choice or autonomy, the protection of dignity and 
the enhancement of participative democracy or social inclu-
sion,” despite differential experiences.19 
Literature on Age Discrimination in Migration 
Law, Policy, and Practice
There is only an emerging body of literature and case law 
on age discrimination generally, with even less on age 
discrimination in migration contexts. In Western liberal 
democracies, the impetus for much of the work on age 
discrimination came from a concern about discrimination 
against older people in the labour force. The Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) was passed in 1967 in the 
United States to outlaw discrimination on the grounds of 
age in employment against workers over the age of forty. 
The Irish Employment Equality Act of 1998 prohibits age 
discrimination in employment against workers aged eight-
een to sixty-five. The EU adopted a non-binding Code of 
Practice on Age Diversity in Employment in 2000. All of 
these provisions set important precedents, but are limiting: 
they address employment exclusively and apply to specific 
chronological age groups.
International human rights conventions are based on 
the principles of equality and dignity for all human beings. 
As Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states, all human beings are “born free and equal in dignity 
and rights.” Age as a ground for discrimination is found 
more broadly in some national constitutions.20 Where the 
provisions of the constitution extend to all people in that 
country—regardless of citizenship—this opens the door 
for advocacy on eliminating age discrimination against 
migrants.
However, very little attention has been paid to the per-
vasive and systematic age discrimination in migration law, 
policy, and practice. Some literature exists on the limits to 
rights of children born in countries of asylum/migration 
to non-citizens. Claire Breen21 analyzes age discrimination 
in relation to Irish-born children of asylum-seekers, while 
Jacqueline Bhabha22 has similarly exposed the “citizenship 
deficit” of American-born children of migrants without 
status and children globally who are “functionally state-
less” as the result of the irregular immigration status of 
their parents.23 Thronson has also extensively analyzed the 
rights of migrant children in the United States and argues 
that immigration law lags behind other areas of law in the 
implementation of children’s rights.24
Research in Australia25 and Canada26 has challenged 
discrimination against migration of older people, on ethical, 
family reunification, and economic grounds. Importantly 
from a policy perspective, both studies provide empirical 
evidence that refutes assumptions that older people will be 
economic “burdens” to host communities.
While there is thus a nascent interest in age discrimi-
nation in migration, the literature is patchy—limited to 
specific issues (e.g., citizenship status and employment) 
and countries (Ireland, Australia, Canada, and the United 
States). Articles in this special focus begin to partially 
address knowledge gaps by covering a wider range of issues 
and countries, but much more research is necessary, as dis-
cussed in the final section.
Key Themes in This Special Focus
The four articles in this special focus address different 
thematic areas in different contexts of forced migration, 
but they share some common themes that help to advance 
understanding of discrimination on the basis of chronologi-
cal age, biological development, and family status. One such 
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theme is intersectionality: “the interrelation of multiple, 
crosscutting institutionalised power relations.”27 Grossman-
Thomson’s article specifically addresses the intersection of 
gender and social age in contexts of patriarchy and paternal-
ism in Nepal, which lead to discriminatory laws preventing 
the out-migration to Gulf States of females under the age of 
thirty. Her analysis indicates that social norms about age 
and migration are conditioned by perceptions of gender and 
religion. Similarly, Silverman argues that the intersection of 
age, gender, and nationality results in “triple discrimination 
against male Afghan ‘imposter-children.’” These articles 
demonstrate that age groups—whether defined by chro-
nology or social markers—are not homogenous categories. 
There is diversity within age-related experiences based on 
other characteristics, particularly gender, religion, race, 
class, and migrant status. These power relations intersect to 
create overlapping experiences of discrimination.
Another important finding across the articles in the 
special focus is related to family status. Both Kanics’s 
and Silverman’s articles draw attention to “accompanied” 
vs. “unaccompanied” children. While the latter are often 
assumed to be particularly vulnerable, Kanics demonstrates 
how children who migrate with their parents are routinely 
denied access to migration-related decisions, despite “best 
interests of the child” provisions within the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and domestic legislation. Indeed, 
the relative privileging of unaccompanied minors within 
national and international legislation may lead to what 
Silverman has cynically described as the “imposter child 
syndrome.” 
All articles address, in different ways, how legal categories 
have real consequences in people’s everyday lives. Seibel’s 
research underscores the transformation of “bureaucratic 
birthdates”—invented for administrative purposes—into 
unquestioned biographical “facts,” which determine peo-
ple’s access to social services and funding. Silverman dem-
onstrates how young migrants without documentation 
navigate legal definitions of childhood.
The research presented in this special focus highlights 
the pervasiveness of age discrimination in migration con-
texts across the world and across the age spectrum. In some 
cases, age discrimination is in contravention of age-related 
provisions, such as the “best interests of the child,” as dem-
onstrated by Kanics. At other times, age discrimination 
is explicitly part of national legislation, as per Grossman-
Thomson’s research in Nepal.
Recommendations for Future Work on Age 
Discrimination and Migration
The articles in this special focus thus make important con-
tributions to the emerging literature on age discrimination 
and migration, but much more remains to be done. First, 
research should build on these and other studies to imple-
ment a more holistic understanding of age, beyond chrono-
logically defined essentialized age categories. We need to be 
thinking of age across the life course, and developing tools 
and understandings of age that take into account individual 
and cross-cultural variations in experiences. Given the 
pervasiveness of chronological age categories as efficient 
administrative indicators, there is a practical imperative to 
develop alternatives. 
This leads to a second recommendation: the need for 
both normative and utilitarian arguments and advocacy 
against age discrimination. At a normative level, one can 
argue that age discrimination is unjust. However, policy 
and legal change is more likely to occur when these social 
justice arguments are accompanied by more pragmatic dis-
cussions of why age-biased laws and policies do not work 
in practice. For this, we need more empirical evidence to 
test assumptions upon which age-based differentiations 
are made. The literature reviewed above and the articles in 
this special focus provide some important case studies, but 
larger-scale quantitative initiatives would help to comple-
ment the literature, which relies mostly on smaller scale 
case studies in particular places and/or about specific age 
groups or immigration categories.
Third, there is a need for deep interdisciplinary collabo-
rations in research on age discrimination. Even within the 
small number of articles in this special focus, the disciplines 
of law, philosophy, anthropology, and political science are 
represented. We need more of this interdisciplinary dia-
logue, with increased collaboration across the social and 
natural sciences. In particular, psychologists and physicians 
have much clinical evidence to offer and should be invited 
into discussions with legal and social science scholars to 
better understand the pervasive and multi-faceted areas of 
age discrimination. 
Finally, we need concerted, international efforts to advo-
cate for more attention to age discrimination. Scholars 
would benefit from partnerships with interested groups 
from outside of academia, including child rights and age 
rights organizations. To effect change, we need a broad-
based movement that challenges age-based stereotypes and 
assumptions, which are deeply entrenched in law and policy 
and normalized in everyday social interactions.
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